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THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY, 1960-1980: 




The Progressive Party was formed in 1959, after a split in the official opposition 
United Party. Liberals from the United Party were joined by a disaffected group 
from the Liberal Paxty who opposed its policies for a universal franchise. The 
roots of Progressive Pazty ideology lay deep in the liberal tradition in South 
Africa. ~ h e - ~ a r t ~  was formed in the belief that race was the most important issue 
and the most dangerous divide in the country. It saw as its primary objective the 
development of a political progamme which would attract support from both the 
white electorate and the disenfranchised black majority. 
This paper will examine the Progressive Party (1) during two periods of 
crisis (2) and intense class struggle. An attempt will be made to show the 
correspondence between the changed politics of the party, structural change and 
class struggle. No attempt is made to suggest rigid chains of causality according 
to some model of economic determinism. The concern of this paper is merely to 
indicate some of the complex interrelationships between economic, political and 
ideological factors. 
B. Structural C h a w  and Crisis 
The nineteen-fifties in South Africa were marked by the rapid growth of manufacturing 
production relative to other sectors. (3) This coincided with a period of rapid 
urbanization and proletarianization of black South Africans. From 1957 to 1961, 
however, there was a period of crisis in South Africa. The average annual rate of 
growth of GDP dropped from 5.1 to 3.2 percent. (4) The industrial expansion of 
eazlier years had generated a balance of payments deficit which had forced the 
state to impose fiscal and monetary constraints. These, in turn, depressed 
industrial production. 
The crisis in international confidence which followed the Sharpeville 
killings in March 1960, and the subsequent declaration of a state of emergency, led 
to the collapse of share prices on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. From 1959 to 
1961 there was an average net annual capital outflow of R88 million, peaking during 
1960. Gold and foreign exchange reserves were cut by half to R153 million by May 
1961. The government was forced to raise the bank rate, curb imports and place 
very severe restrictions on foreign exchange dealings to remedy the situation. (5) l l 
Calls for political reform and accommodation of black demands came in a 
chorus from representatives of capitalists in virtually every sector of 
production. (6) In the midst of all the panic, and as share prices plummeted, 
Harry Oppenheimer's Anglo American Group moved to stabilise the capital markets and 
restore confidence. At the same time, it acquired shares and penetrated companies 
and sectors which greatly enhanced its influence and strength in the South African 
economy. 
The restructuring of production relations which occurred during the crisis 
involved the extension of monopoly production, and of interpenetration of capitals, 
including Ehglish and Afrikaans capitals. Over ten years of boom followed, with 
average annual GDP increases of 6.5 percent between 1961 and 1969. (7) Structural 
changes during the years of boom, and particularly concentration of capital, 
contributed to rising unemployment levels. In 1960 unemployment stood at 18.3 
percent of the economically active work-force. By 1970 it had climbed to 20.4 
percent, or 1,758,000 people. (8) At the same time the contribution to GDP of the 
manufacturing and construction sectors increased from 24.1 percent to 28.2 percent 
(1962-1970) (9) 
It was the source of the boom, however, the growth of marmfacturing, which 
contained the seeds of the crisis to follow. The contradiction lay in the fact that 
the rapid growth of manufacturing was achieved through the importation of machinery 
and equipment. The result was that, as the decade progressed, the value of South 
Africa's imports rose faster than that of exports, generating a substantial and 
growing balance of payments deficit. 
During the early years of the following decade the growth of monopoly 
capital was accompanied by clear indications of impending crisis. Although GDP 
growth for the first half of the decade had averaged 3.9 percent per year, it had 
fluctuated between 8 percent and 3 percent per year. (10) Following the uprisings 
in Soweto and elsewhere, panic withdrawals of capital by foreign investors allied to 
work stoppages and disruptions resulted in an effect on economic activity so severe 
that GDP actually contracted. (11) A brief boom and the recovery of domestic demand 
resulted in GIP growth climbing to 8 percent by 1980. But by 1981 it had dropped 
back to less than 5 percent. (12) By 1982, the economy had stagnated and the country 
faced record inflation rates, At 16.5 percent, inflation was at its highest level 
since 1920. (13) 
There were other signs of instability and crisis during the nineteen- 
seventies. The balance of papnents deficit continued, averaging R838 million per 
year for the first half of the decade. Capital restructuring, concentration and 
expansion demanded an exceptionally high rate of investment, 29.2 percent of GDP 
compared to 25 percent during the period 1961 to 1969. (14) A 5 percent devaluation 
of the Rand a,gainst the US dollar in 1971, and a 17.9 percent devaluation in 1975, 
were necessary to improve the terns of trade. (15) In 1977, after Soweto, there was 
a net outflow in short-term capital of R1,086 million and a net Rlll million outflow 
of loneterm capital. For an economy which relied on foreign investors to provide 
15 percent of total investment, this was disastrous. (16) 
Unprecedented increases in gold revenues, up 31 percent in 1977-8 and 43 
percent in 1978-9, following the soaring of free market gold prices, however, led to 
huge current account surpluses in those years. (17) The gold boom continued into 
1980, and fuelled the economic recovery. The beneficial effects of the gold price, 
by allowing increased domestic investment, disguised the continuing outflow of 
capital in pursuit of the high short-term interest rates prevalent outside the 
country. (18) A sharp decline in the gold price in 1981 revealed a large deficit in 
the bdance of payments, forcing the government to turn to the IMF for loans of 
US $1,320 million in 1982. (19) 
The collapse in production after 1976 affected manufacturing most severely. 
The GIP share of manufacturing and construction dropped from 28 percent in 1975 to 
25 percent in 1979. (20) Unemployment continued its upward trend, climbing from 
20.4 percent in 1970 to 22.4 percent in 1977 (2,301,000) . (21) By 1980 it was 
probably over 2.5 million. (22) 
As the above account makes clear, both periods of crisis resulted from 
imbalances caused by the growth of the importance of manufacturing production. The 
restructuring arising from the crisis of the nineteen-seventies was marked by the 
growth of monopoly capitalist relations, through centralization brought on by the 
wealmess of many non-monopoly enterprises, and the need for a rationalization of 
production following the economic slump. (23) The -10 American Group was central 
to the processes at work. Having begun primarily as a minin organization, by 1980 
the Group had diversified into every sector of the economy. 64) 
C. Class Struggle, Crisis and State Responses 
The nineteen-fifties in South Africa were marked by the growing nationalist struggle 
against white rule and against the apartheid system. While some specifically class 
issues were taken up, the campaigns as a whole were not overtly class based, but 
were based on the common oppression of black people, aua especially of African 
people, under white rule. The primary objective of the struggles was the winning of 
equal treatment for black and white under the state. As a result, the main thrust 
was a political one. Because of this, the state was able to defeat the African 
nationalist struggle by destroying its political organisations. 
By the start of the crisis of the nineteen-seventies the disposition of 
class forces was different, the nature of black political organization had changed 
and so had the relations of production. All combined to make the repressive option 
a less viable response by the state to challenges to the system. While black people 
were fax more proletarianized, capitalists were far more dependent on black workers 
than they had been a decade earlier. The rapid capital intensification of production 
had involved increasing demands for skilled and semi-skilled factory workers. 
Strikes became more costly, some workers were more difficult to replace when 
dismissed and the existence of an organized proletariat made solidarity action more 
likely and reduced scabbing by unemployed workers. 
Monopoly capitalist enterprises became increasingly interpenetrated with 
foreign multi-nationals, making them more susceptible to overseas pressure. Growing 
interpenetration and centralization of enterprises meant that disputes tended to have 
wider spin-offs, affecting more than just isolated firms. As fixed capital stock 
increased, and the possibilities for rapid retreats from South Africa by foreign 
investors diminished, so the need grew for a system which guaranteed loneterm 
stability. 
The greater strength of workers was reflected in their increased militancy. 
In 1973 a massive series of strikes involving 98,000 workers occurred. Between 1974 
and 1979 the number of workers on strike each year did not drop below 14,000. (25) 
In 1980, 95,000 workers were involved in strikes (26), and in 1981 the figure was 
93,000. (27) 
The response of the South African authorities to the resurgence of strikes 
and popular opposition, including an escalation of the armed struggle by the ANC, 
was to use the armed forces and apply and extend the repressive legislation enacted 
during the nineteen sixties. As the decade progressed, however, the state came 
under pressure to adopt a more reformist approach. With the ousting of Vorster as 
Prime Minister, and following the uprisings of 1976-7, it officially began cautious 
moves in a reformist direction. This stop-go reformism will not be examined here. 
Suffice it to note that the response of the state, post-Soweto, was very different 
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from i ts  response a f te r  Sharpeville. 
D. C h m s  i n  the Policies of the Pro,gressive Party 
The two periods of c r i s i s  under study coincided with the reports of constitutional 
commissions s e t  up by the Progressive Pazty. The f i r s t ,  chaired by ex-Liberal 
Party member Donald Molteno, was se t  up soon a f te r  the forma.tion of the party, to  
formulate i t s  constitutional proposals. It reported i n  1960 and 1962. (28) The 
second, chaired by F. van Zyl Slabbert, was  s e t  up i n i t i a l l y  i n  1974, 
reconstituted i n  1977 and reported i n  1978. (29) 
The Molteno Commission specifically interpreted i ts  task as the 
formulation of constitutional proposals fo r  a multi-racial system, "a frame-work 
within which our vasious racia l  communities m a y  co-exist and co-operate as one 
civil ised nation1'. (30) The Commission understood i ts  terms of reference as 
requiring the recommendation of "safeguazds for  racia l  communities1'. (31) A t  the 
same time it sought to  entrench i n  the constitutional proposals guaranteed rights 
and l ibe r t i es  fo r  individuals. 
The majority of the commissioners interpreted the i r  terms of reference as 
precluding a system of universal adult suffrage, but a t  the same time sought to 
just ify thei r  Majority Report recommendation of a qualified franchise by reference 
to the ''degree of civilisation1' of individual voters. Such llcivilisation", they 
azgued, w a s  necessarry for  the "effective functioning of democratic institutions1'. 
While a minority dissented from this, the major asea of disagreement w a s  over the 
exact qualifications which should be demanded of voters. The majority formulated 
the following " tes t  of civilisation" according to  which ci t izens should be judged: 
Such qualifications should embrace those elements of 
the population that  have attained an economic level 
or  a degree of sophistication such as to enable them 
to feel  sufficient identification with society as a 
whole - t o  possess sufficient 'stake i n  the country' - 
not to f a l l  prey to total i tazian illusions. (32) 
S. Cooppan, one of the black members of the Commission who did not sign the Majority 
Report, argued that  such a mere extension of privilege to  a s m a l l  number of black 
South Africans would simply substitute class for race divisions. 
I doubt the wisdom of attempting to  create and 
crystal l ize class divisions amongst the non-Whites 
i n  the dilemma of avoiding the universal franchise. 
The asea of conflict would merely sh i f t  from race to  
class, and the l a t t e r  form could be equally 
unpleasant. (33) 
The majority commissioners ignored Cooppan's warnings. They regarded African 
nationalism as the primaxy threat. A provision that  no past voters would be 
disenfranchised ensued that the qualifications would be demanded only of black 
South Africans, i n  the f i r s t  instance. 
Referring to possible criticisms of the i r  report, the Majority 
commissioners accepted that  f o r  black South Africans "the demand i s  general, among 
the pol i t ica l ly  conscious elements, for  adult suffrage1'. They did not dispute the 
legitimacy of th i s  position, but went on to  argue: 
Whilst understanding t h i s  at t i tude,  we are bound to  
point out that  it  bears no necessary relation to  
personal freedom, the rule of l a w ,  ordered progress, 
or any of the other values that  Western democracy was 
conceived i n  order to foster. Its inspiration i s  
rather non-White nationalism, which, l ike  all 
nationalisms, i s  ultimately to ta l i tar ian i n  i t s  
logical outcome. (34) 
The Nolteno Report continued with an outline of a proposed B i l l  of Rights 
fo r  the protection of individual freedoms. Among those "freedoms" to  be protected 
was the r ight  to  segregated schools, housing, transport, hospitals, prisons or  "any 
other service, amenity or  public ins t i tu t ion whatsoever", provided that  all "classes 
of the community" had equal fac i l i t i e s .  Interestingly, while S. Cooppan and 
R. E. van der Ross dissented from the sections allowing provision of separate 
services, Haxry Oppenheimer and Zach de Beer qualified the i r  assent thus: 
I n  so f a r  as  these provisions might be construed as 
prohibiting compulsory racia l  zoning for  residential 
purposes, they dissent therefrom. (35) 
The constitutional and franchise proposals adopted by the party i n  1960 
and 1962 were conservative and racis t .  L i t t l e  notice w a s  taken of the dissenting 
opinions of the black Commission members (36), and the National Executive of the 
party actually took a more, rather than less,conservative position than the 
majority of the Commission. The party w a s  concerned with making the min imum 
concessions to  buy off black protests and defuse the nationalist  struggle while 
appeasing white prejudice and assuring whites of continuing power and control. 
The Slabbert Committee formulated i ts  constitutional proposals a t  another 
time of c r i s i s  and pol i t ica l  ins tab i l i ty  i n  South Africa. It w a s  a time when white 
parliamentary opposition was i n  chaos, following the f ina l  collapse and disintegration 
of the United Party. The Slabbert Committee, l ike  the Molteno Commission, s e t  out t o  
formulate constitutional proposals which would "remove the barriers of discrimination" 
without resulting i n  'l the domination of one group over anotherff. (36) A t  the same 
time, however, it  was c r i t i c a l  of past l iberal  thinking which had dismissed group 
loyalt ies and group a f f i l i a t ions  i n  favour of the individual. It identified the 
group/individual debate as "largely responsible fo r  s t e r i l e  and f ru i t l ess  pol i t ica l  
discussion", which had dominated white politics. Instead of the prevalent 
dichotomous view, a dynamic interrelationship between individual and group was the 
real i ty ,  the issue of overriding importance being "that the individual should be 
allowed to  exercise h i s  or  her r ight  of voluntary association". (37) The Committee 
went further, however, and emphasised that  one of the negative effects of the 
existing system was that  it  had "inhibited the development of groups with cross- 
cutting aff i l ia t ions  that  could counteract race and ethnic confl icts  and antagonisms 
i n  our plural society". (38) 
In  formulating i ts  proposals, the Slabbert Committee took specific 
cognisance of existing pol i t ica l  conflict. (39) It recommended "a structure of 
government where the resolution of conflict has to  be achieved within the pol i t ica l  
process i t se l f" .  I n  adopting thei r  recommendations, the party congress of 1978 
expressed i t s  belief  
that  the ins t i tu t ion of a new pol i t ica l  dispensation 
i n  South Africa has become a matter or  urgency i f  we 
are to  prevent the escalation of the present racia l  
confrontation into violent conflict. (40) 
The Report differed from the Molteno Report i n  that  it stressed the 
party's commitment to  "an equal r ight  to fu l l  citizenship" fo r  all South Africans. 
The qualified franchise w a s  abandoned, together with notions of "Western civilization", 
and a universal adult suffrage was proposed. Its terms of reference called for  a 
sharing of pol i t ica l  r ights by all  citizens and equal economic opportunity. They 
precluded "all inequitable forms of statutory or administrative discrimination on 
the grounds of race, colour, religion or sex'' as  "unacceptable i n  the ideal society 
fo r  which the party w i l l  strive". (41) In  elaborating these principles, party 
leader Colin Eglin made it clear that  he recognized that  such equal pol i t ica l  
representation was essential: 
The Party believes that  the possession of f u l l  
citizenship rights i s  the basis of loyalty towards 
our country. Without this we w i l l  not be able to  
maintain an orderly society or  effectively defend 
our country against external or internal attacks. (42) 
The Slabbert Report was c r i t i c a l  of the Molteno Commission, by implication, 
fo r  conhsing the issue of domination with that  of the franchise: 
the threat of domination i s  incidental to  and not a 
consequence of the system of franchise i n  operation. 
It all depends what the structure of mvernment i s  
within which the franchise i s  exercised. (43) 
Accordingly, the Committee rejected a Westminster-style system and opted instead fo r  
a system including proportional representation, decentralized executive, legislat ive 
and judicial systems, and a minority veto. While t h i s  system, combined with a b i l l  
of r ights,  was designed to  guarantee the impossibility of majority domination, the 
Committee, l ike  the Molteno Commission before it, was at pains to deny any rac i s t  
motivation: 
i t  would be a complete misrepresentation of the 
recommendations i n  relat ion to domination i f  the 
minority veto i s  presented as a measure to  preserve 
the privileged position of a minority a t  the 
expense of other groups i n  society. (44) 
Haxry Oppenheimer welcomed the Report as a valuable contribution to  the 
debate on which direction the country should move in. He said: 
I ' m  actually rather pleased with this. I've read the 
thing through ... and I feel  that  at long l a s t  there 
i s  a real  basis fo r  sensible discussion, and I think 
this i s  about a l l  one needs - or  real ly  can give. I 
w a s  very pleased with this. (45) 
The Slabbert Committee perceived the need for  a break with the ideologies 
of the past, both l iberal  individualist and racis t ,  and the adoption of new 
ideological forms. I n  a conscious effor t  to accommodate black disillusionment with 
capitalism i n  South Africa, van Zyl Slabbert dropped the notion of a "free enterprise 
economy" from the recommendations. He was of the view that  "free enterprise" would 
not be an issue within five or  s i x  years. 
It i s  an ideological concept which w i l l  become the 
target of aggression fo r  a whole range of black 
pol i t ica l  organisations. (46) 
A t  the same time Slabbert perceived the need to  create an ideolom of s t a t e  
neutral i ty and sepaxation from capital.  He held that  the role  of government would 
be to  distribute wealth, not to create it, wealth creation being the role  of business. 
"The wealth generators are the economic entrepreneurs; the wealth distributors are 
the pol i t ica l  entrepreneurs. (47) 
It was not chance which resulted i n  the coincidence between periods of 
intense class struggle and c r i s i s ,  and the production of constitutional reports by 
the Progressive Party. The party responded to  pol i t ica l  change and pressures i n  
South Africa, and also to  the needs of i ts  class constituency. Both studies were 
s e t  up a t  the height of periods of c r i s i s  and upheaval. Both were attempts to  provide 
answers to problems requiring immediate resolution. From the point of view of the 
party they provided reassurances to i t s  class constituents that  something dynamic 
w a s  being offered as an alternative to  chaos. To l ibe ra l  voters and conservative 
black South Africans they provided models for  continued hopes of peaceful 
reconciliation i n  the future. They also bolstered the image of the party as  a 
viable pol i t ica l  alternative to  the National Party. This w a s  particularly 
important a f te r  1977, when the Progressive Federal Party fo r  the f i r s t  time became 
the o f f ic ia l  parliamentary opposition to  the government. 
E. Relations with Black Groups 
During both periods under consideration, the Progressive Party attempted to 
establish working alliances with black groups or  individuals sympathetic to i t s  
objectives. The response of the African National Congress to  the formation of the 
Progressive Party was a cautious welcome. ANC leaders were even prepared to take 
some credit  fo r  the emergence of the party, seeing i t  as a response by l ibe ra l  
whites to the demands of the Congress Movement. Vigorous opposition by the 
Progressive Party to  the s ta te  of emergency, the banning of the ANC and the PAC, 
and detentions without trial, h t h e r  improved relations with the Congress Movement. 
The publication of the f i r s t  volume of the Molteno Report, however, and 
the decision to  pursue a qualified franchise, crystallized the differences between 
the organizations and brought into the open the party's antagonism to  African 
nationalism. "Extremism and Black nationalism would have to be broken", according to 
Steytler, before black people would subscribe to the partyt S policies. (48) l 
Despite this, co-operation between the organizations continued. I n  March 
1961 Progressive Party representatives participated i n  an "All-In1' African 
Conference called by 40 leaders of the ANC, PAC, Liberal and Progressive Parties. (49) 
Before the 1961 general election, Albert Lu-hnli, President of the banned ANC, issued 
a statement supporting the Progressive candidates. After the election Lutuli 
announced that ,  while he deeply regretted the increased support f o r  the National 
Party, the support received by the Progressive Party was an encouraging sign. (50) 
Similar messages of congratulation on the resul ts  of the general election were sent 
to the Progressives by Joe Daniels, secretary of the Coloured National Convention 
Movement, and Monty Naiker, president of the South African Indian Congress. (51) 
The year ended with relat ions between the Progressive Party and many black leaders 
and groups on a cordial footing, despite continuing condemnation by the party of 
"non-White nationalismIf . 
Early i n  1962, however, a watershed i n  party policy was reached, with the 
presentation to  the National Executive of a memorandum on relations with extra- 
parliamentary groups. The paper, written by Donald Molteno and Peggy Roberts, argued 
for  co-operation with black pol i t ica l  groups (by definition extra-parliamentary) on 
the grounds that  demonstrating black support would be the only way of winning white 
votes. Black protests, they wrote, were essential to persuade voters that  there was 
a need for  change and, therefore, fo r  the Progressive Party. (52) 
The memorandum proved too radical fo r  the National Executive Committee of 
the party, however, and w a s  rejected. A t  the same time an active campaign w a s  
launched to  recrui t  African members directly to  party ranks, something which had been 
dismissed by Molteno and Roberts as doomed from the start. (53) There were two main 
reasons fo r  the rejection of the memorandum. The f i r s t  derived from worries about 
the effects on white electoral support of a close association with groups which were I 
seen by most whites as dangerously subversive. The second w a s  related to  the party's 
franchise proposals. Organizations l ike  the ANC enjoyed mass support among exactly I 
those black South Africans whom the Progressives proposed to exclude from the 
franchise as insufficiently "civilised" to  vote. The party leadership f e l t  unable to  
collaborate with the organizations of people they believed to  be unf i t  t o  vote. 
Once the party had decided against co-operation with black pol i t ica l  
organizations, it  soon became commonplace fo r  i t s  spokesmen to  condemn i n  the same 
breath African nationalism, the sabotage campaign and the independent black countries 
i n  the res t  of Africa, This w a s  combined with optimistic reports of the 
"encouraging" increases i n  African membership of the party and of the establishment 
of African branches. (54) In  fact ,  very few black members joined the party un t i l  
the launching of its campaign among Coloured voters two years la ter .  
I In  January 1964 the party began a campaign to win the four seats 
representing Coloured voters i n  Parliament. Many of the Coloured people who 
1 registered as voters joined the party. The Progressives claimed this ,  and the 
success of the Democratic Party i n  the Transkei Assembly elections i n  1963, as 
evidence of widespread black support fo r  thei r  policies. I n  fact ,  the overwhelming 1 support fo r  the Democratic Party i n  Transkei, l ike  Coloured votes fo r  Progressive 
Party candidates, w a s  a demonstration by black voters of the i r  opposition t o  
apartheid, rather than an endorsement of the specific policies of the parties. 
l 
I Progressive Party at t i tudes to  black South Africans were very different 
during the nineteen-seventies. The party had ceased to be a multi-racial party i n  
1968, with the passage of the Prohibition of Pol i t ica l  Interference Act. The 
government did the party a favour with th i s  legislation, by releasing the 
Progressives from the embarrassment of claiming extensive black support while being 
unable to  point to sigaificant black membership. After passage of the Act, party 
' efforts  were devoted to establishing contact with black "leaders" and pol i t ica l  
I organizations instead of competing with such organizations fo r  membership. Soon 
, a f t e r  the election of Colin Eglin as the new Leader, i n  February 1971, the party w a s  
/ involved i n  high-profile publicity exercises to demonstrate the acceptability of i t s  
I policies among black people. I n  October 1971, Eglin and Helen Suzman made an 
extensively publicised tour of independent Africar, countries. They were received 
by Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Gambian President Dauda Jawara, Kofie Busia i n  Ghana, 
: Kenyan Vice-President Daniel Arap Moi, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kamum Banda 
of Malawi. (55) A year l a t e r  a similar high-profile llconsultation exercisei1 with 
homeland leaders and some opposition politicians, i n  Transkei, Ciskei, KwaZulu, 
I Lebowa, Ga~ankulu, Venda, and Bophuthatswana was held by Eglin, Suzman and Ray Swart , 
NEC chairman. (56) The party was quite unembarrassed a t  i ts  consultation with the 
very homeland leaders who were the lynch-pins of National Party plans to  fo i s t  
I independence on the inhabitants of these areas. 
By contrast, there w a s  l i t t l e  contact with, and often hos t i l i ty  from, 
black-consciousness leaders. In 1972, the South African Students' Organisation 
(sASO) took the following line: 
SAS0 believes that  all groups allegedly working fo r  
'integration' i n  South Africa ... and here we note 
i n  particular the Progressive Party and other l ibe ra l  
inst i tut ions ... are not working fo r  the kind of 
integration that  would be acceptable to  the black man. 
Their attempts are directed merely a t  relaxing certain 
oppressive legislat ions and to allow blacks in to  a 
white-type society. (57) 
While there were some contacts with radical black people (58), i t  was with 
more conservative organizations that  the party had i ts  strongest links. Relations 
with the anti-apartheid Coloured Labour Party were cordial, f o r  instance, with 
several ex-Progressive Party members prominent i n  the leadership of the party. The 
most important l ink w a s  with M. G. Buthelezil S Inkatha YeNkululeko YeSizwe. 
Contact was formalized i n  an "on-going l ia ison committee with the PFP and Inkatha", 
according to the architect of the links, Ray Swart. (59) After a meeting between 
Eglin, Swart, Buthelezi and S. M. Bhengu (~ec re t a ry -~ene ra l  of ~nkatha)  i n  1978, a 
joint statement was issued. It said that much common ground had been discovered and 
that  there w a s  a basis fo r  agreement on a new constitutional frame-work fo r  South 
Africa. Buthelezi expressed support f o r  the structure proposed by the PFPIs 
Slabbert Committee. (60) Close co-operation continued. A commission se t  up by 
Buthelezi to formulate a new constitutional structure integrating white Natal with 
KwaZulu w a s  chaired by Professor Denys Schreiner, a long-time member of the 
Progressive Party. After the Buthelezi Commission reported, Slabbert and Buthelezi 
met, on 5 April 1982, and issued a joint statement reaffirming thei r  commitment to 
fu l l  citizenship r ights for  a l l  South Africans and to "equality of opportunity i n  
the economy11. (61) 
In  a very revealing document tabled by Buthelezi fo r  discussion a t  the 
meeting, he argued that  the Progressive Federal Party could not survive as a 
pol i t ica l  force without the support of Inkatha. He wrote: 
The PFP has no f i tu re  whatsoever outside a Black 
partnership, nor do whites i n  general have any 
future outside a Black partnership. The PFP seeks 
a new dispensation and the voice i n  the wilderness 
which it now constitutes can only become the voice 
of authority when i t s  roots extend into Black soi l .  
In  the rea l i ty  of the South African situation, PFP 
continuity into the future and i t s  survival as a 
pol i t ica l  force i n  fact depends on Inkatha. Inkatha 
i s  the only mass organisation of the people. It has 
the only Black leadership which is  structured. It 
i s  the only Black pol i t ica l  organisation which has 
tackled the game of constituency poli t ics.  It i s  
only i n  t h i s  constituency pol i t ics  that  Black and 
White can establish co-operation. (62) 
Perhaps Buthelezi was correct that,  from the point of view of the PFP, 
there was only one significant potential a l l y  among existing black organisations. 
Slabbert identified the di f f icul t ies  he faced: 
i t 's  easier  to  ta lk  to the moderate pol i t ica l  
organisations. If its a black consciousness kind of 
movement then part of i t s  rationale i s  not to have 
contact or seek contact with whites. 
There i s  no alliance or  any formal structure of an 
alliance between us and black organisations. I think 
also one reason being that the diversity of opinion 
and at t i tude i n  blacks makes it very di f f icul t .  You 
can't  get an alliance going between say the Committee 
of Ten, Inkatha and ourselves. It' S simply not on. (63) 
The independent trade unions, apast from legal bars on association between trade 
unions and pol i t ica l  part ies,  were not interested i n  a pol i t ica l  alliance with tk 
party of the bosses. Links with exile movements were out of the question. 
As long as the African nationalist organisations posed a significant threat 
to  the system, during the early nineteen-sixties, the Progressive Party sought t o  
preserve i ts  potential as an organisation of compromise i n  the event of an extension 
of the conflict. Once the organisations had been destroyed by the s ta te  and forced 
underground, the party made the sudden discovery that  l inks with them would be a 
major electoral l i ab i l i ty .  It proceeded to condemn African nationalism as a danger 
on a par with "Communismll, and as total i tarian.  It then sought to  compete against 
such organisations for membership, and interpreted votes by black people against 
apaztheid as votes for  i ts  policies and for  llmoderation" rather than confrontation. 
l 
By the s t a r t  of the second period, having l o s t  i ts  black members, the party 
discovered the need to  demonstrate llconsultation" with internal black leaders and, i n  
the absence of "moderate" leaders recognised by black South Africans, w a s  forced to 
turn t o  those appointed by the South African government. As pol i t ica l  confrontation 
grew, the party attempted to  make contact with leaders of more radical currents, but 
found i t s e l f  ei ther rejected by these groups o r  talking to "opinion makers", people 
l ike  Ntatho Motlana of the Committee of Ten, who refused to  be termed "leaders", 
and refused to become involved i n  anything other than informal contact. (64) 
Instead, the party was forced to  re ly  almost exclusively on i ts  contact with Inkatha, 
t o  demonstrate the compatibility of i ts  policies with black aspirations: a fact  
Buthelezi was not slow to  point out t o  the party. 
F. Party Ideology and Relations with Active Capitalists 
The f ina l  section of this paper deals with the close relations between the party and 
certain sections of the capi ta l is t  class. A t  i t s  Inaugural Congress i n  November 
1959, the Progressive Party adopted basic statements on economic and social policy. 
Harry Oppenheimer was closely consulted on these, alterations being made to  
accommodate most of h i s  criticisms. ( 6 5 )  The policy adopted by the Congress on 
African trade union rights, fo r  instance, called fo r  the "restoration of the freedom 
of the trade unions1', but qualified the ca l l  with a recommendation that  unskilled 
workers be organized into separate unions under the control of the Department of 
Labour. (66) This formulation catered fo r  worries expressed by Oppenheimer about 
maintenance of "a proper standard" of unionism. (67) Thus the party avoided one of 
the major pol i t ica l  drawbacks of an unequivocal commitment to free trade unions - 
the objections of mining capi ta l is ts ,  and especially the gold mining owners, t o  the 
unionization of mine workers. 
Such discrimination was justified by reference to the freedom of 
individual black South Africans to  improve the i r  situation. The Progressive Party 
did not object to  discrimination or inequality on principle. Its objection was  to 
the fac t  that  the discrimination and inequalities were imposed only on people of 
colour, and on a l l  people of colour. I f  the colour bar was l i f t ed ,  the inequalities 
would no longer offend the c r i t i c a l  outside world, or  l iberal  sensibi l i t ies  inside 
South Africa. Allowing an equal b i t e  a t  the cake to a minority of black people would 
sa t is fy  the moral scruples expressed by l ibe ra l  opponents of apartheid. This f i t t e d  
well with the needs and demands of capi ta l is ts  at that  time. They wanted the 
pol i t ica l  challenges to the s ta te  bought off by pol i t ica l  concessions. They wanted 
more skil led workers and supervisors who could only come from the ranks of black 
South Africans. They did not want a redistribution of wealth or  a destruction of 
the cheap labour system, An ideology of individualism was admirably suited to those 
needs. As the N a t a l  leader of the party, Leo Boyd, expressed i t  i n  a confidential 
memo to  Steytler, 
Our policies go further - they seek to break down the 
group complex, focussing attention upon the individual 
so that  ultimately we become a nations [sic] of 
individuals and not members of majority or  minority 
groups. SECURITY for  the individual must also be 
prominently featured i n  our programmes. (68) 
Speaking a t  a dinner fo r  business people i n  1965, Harry Oppenheimer warned 
of the consequences of continued suppression of individuals because of the i r  colour. 
It i s  a terr ib le  mistake, because revolutions are not 
made by the masses of the people. Revolutions anywhere 
are made by disgruntled individuals of ab i l i ty  who find 
no room for  the exercise of the i r  talents and i f  you 
attempt to  keep them back by reference to some assumed 
level of the group to  which they belong, then you are 
simply taking steps to provide the leaders who can 
eventually ... change the a f fa i r s  of th i s  country, and 
change them by violence. (69) 
On the macro-level, therefore the Progressive appeal for  support from the 
capi ta l is t  class w a s  based on the danger of a revolutionary overthrow of the system. 
On the micro-level, the Progressive Party attacked the government for  causing the 
crises through the restr ict ions it imposed on production. The general argument was 
contained i n  an early recruiting pamphlet enti t led The Proeessive Answer. It read: 
I n  South Africa we are all poorer than we should be 
because we do not make the best use of our human 
resources. Job reservation, aimed at protecting the 
White workers, actually harpls both White and Black . . . 
Government restr ict ions are a t  present limiting our 
potential out-put and wealth. We plan to increase 
productivity and earning power by removing harplful 
restr ict ions,  providing bet ter  technical training 
f ac i l i t i e s  for  al l  races, l i f t i n g  industrial  colour 
bars and creating healthy conditions of trade union 
democracy. (70) 
After the emergency the party had a f a r  stronger case to  argue and did so 
i n  an election pamphlet called Into a New World. Referring directly to the aftermath 
of Sharpeville and the emergency, the pamphlet read: 
Nationalist legislat ion has resulted i n  the 
deterioration of our economy and our w a y  of l i f e .  
Money has poured out of the country at an 
unprecedented ra te  and the prospect of sustained 
recovery i s  unlikely unless reforms are ins t i tu ted 
soon. World opinion i s  against us. We embarrass 
our friends and our enemies make capital  out of our 
mistakes. (71) 
The party believed that  overseas investors would respond most favourably to the 
introduction of policies designed specifically to ameliorate the causes of the 
conflicts. The argument ran thus: 
The obstacle t o  investment today i s  purely and 
simply poli t ical .  In  order to regain a flow of 
capital ,  we need to  convince the outside world - or  
rather, the capital-exporting nations - that,  to put 
it  bluntly, there i s  not going to be a revolution i n  
South Africa. (72) 
Although the party did make appeals to the capi ta l is t  class for  financial 
and electoral support, the main thrust of i ts propaganda during the f i r s t  half of the 
nineteen s ixt ies  w a s  directed a t  the white electorate as a whole. After i ts  
humiliating performance i n  the 1966 general election, a thorough reassessment of the 
party's approach was made. The new strategy evolved included a decision to direct 
its effor ts  and propaganda specifically a t  "business". The new, specific 
orientation to the capi ta l is t  class a f t e r  1966 meant that  by the start of the second 
period of c r i s i s  the party w a s  f a  more closely a l l i ed  to  the sympathetic sections of 
that  class. 
After Soweto, certain sections of the capi ta l is t  class, disillusioned with 
the s ta te  as a vehicle for  reform, decided to s e t  up thei r  own organization. Its 
task was to  engage i n  exemplary reformist ac t iv i t i es  to encourage similar action by 
the s ta te ,  but also to  buy off some of the black resentment and frustrat ion which had 
exploded i n  Soweto. This organization, the Urban Foundation, w a s  s e t  up i n  1977. 
Irene Mennell, a Progressive Federal Party representative i n  the Transvaal Provincial 
Council, who was instrumental i n  se t t ing up the Urban Foundation, contrasted the 
at t i tudes of capi ta l is ts  with whom she had had sontact, before and a f t e r  Soweto. A t  
f i r s t ,  opposition to  apartheid was r i tualized and formalistic, confined to annual 
meetings and reports. 
It happened once a year. The r e s t  of the year one 
went on gett ing permits or  an exemption to  put a 
plant there, o r  an exemption to employ more people 
there, and it kind of worked and your company 
grew.... And your prof i ts  were fine. (73) 
After Soweto, however, at t i tudes changed. 
It's still  a b i t  patchy and a b i t  confused but there 
i s  an evergrowing awareness that  you can't hope to 
survive as a flourishing business i n  the long term i n  
South Africa against t h i s  pol i t ica l  climate, and the 
economic and socio-economic climate. So, therefore, 
you'd bet ter  get out and use your resources to  try and 
make some corrections, hopefully i n  time. (74) 
This new att i tude by capi ta l is ts  was reflected i n  the i r  relationships with 
the Progressive Party. A t  about the same time as i t s  electoral breakthrough i n  
1974, the Progressive Party achieved a similar breakthrough i n  at tracting vastly 
increased support from i ts  "natural". constituency i n  the capi ta l is t  class. From 
1973 to 1977 the party National Treasurer and chief fund ra i se r  was Gordon Waddell, 
an executive director of the Anglo American Corporation and ex-son-in-law of Harry 
Oppenheimer. A s  Irene Mennell expressed it i n  an interview i n  1978, "There are few 
big  Johannesburg companies who have not been approached and given". (75) With 
Gordon Waddell going around sol ic i t ing donations i t  was very hard fo r  fellow 
capi ta l is ts  to s a ~  no. So successful w a s  Waddell's fund-raising that i n  January 
1974 the party's newspaper, Propress, reported a 100 percent increase i n  fwnds and 
a 200 percent increase i n  large donations. ( 7 6 )  
This increase i n  financial support from the capi ta l is t  class coincided 
with the development of an economic analysis which took account of the structural 
changes which had occurred i n  the economy. Noting the tendency towards greater 
concentration of capital,  Gordon Waddell argued that  use of low wage, unskilled 
labour slowed growth and reduced l iv ing standards for  all the country' S inhabitants. 
Arguing that  the potential of the countryls whole population should be harnessed, he 
said: 
we cannot continue to  move forward as we should by 
simply employing larger and larger numbers of unskilled 
workers i n  industry or  on mines at low wages. That 
phase i s  over and the realisat ion of our potential fo r  
f'urther rapid growth depends on the development of 
greater sk i l l s  by the mass of workers who are already 
i n  industry o r  who w i l l  join it i n  the future so that 
their  productivity and thei r  earnings can be steadily 
increased,. (77) 
The Progressive Reform Party, as it  became, extended the argument beyond 
the contention that  a new deal fo r  black people was necessary fo r  economic growth. 
I n  an a r t i c le  published i n  May 1976, the new chairman of the party's Federal 
Executive, Harry Schwara, argued that  a new form of capitalism w a s  called fo r  i n  
South Africa, to  combat the threat of socialism. 
M r  Schwarz said he believed that  old-time capitalism 
w a s  dead, and South Africa should propagate a f ree  
enterprise system i n  the true sense of the word. 'I 
also believe that  the free enterprise system has to 
get on to  the offensive and attack socialism1, he 
said. IIf  we do not, I believe that  the true f ree  
enterprise system i s  doomed. ' 
(The t e s t  of free enterprise i s  not how good it i s  for  
the capi ta l is t  and how much prof i t  can be made out of 
it. The true t e s t  is  what it does fo r  the man who has 
no capital,  what it  does fo r  the worker and fo r  the 
individual. Is he bet ter  off i n  a free enterprise system 
than he would be under socialism?' 
' the problem i n  South Africa i s  not only colour; it  i s  
a potential conflict between capital and labour. This i s  
why one has to  convince the people who represent labour, 
who are the Black consumers, that  there i s  a place fo r  
them i n  the free enterprise system.' (78) 
The arguments of the party leadership had changed markedly since the 
nineteen-sixties, i n  l ine  with changed real i t ies .  The question of colour w a s  no 
longer seen as  fundamental, but as a divide which disguised f a r  more dangerous 
class divisions. The threat of revolution was no longer primarily a threat to 
white power, or  to 'Western Civilization", but to  capitalism i t s e l f .  
The experience of the Soweto uprisings sharpened party anxieties. In  a 
speech to the Graduate School of Business a t  the University of Cape Town i n  
September 1976, Colin Eglin urged business people to play a more act iv is t  part  i n  
the pol i t ics  of the country. Race conflict,  he warned, was becoming class conflict. 
The sharpening of class conflict has been accelerated 
by events outside as well as the very rea l  and wide 
gap between the ' haves' and the 'have nots within 
South Africa. It i s  seen, f e l t  and increasingly 
resented by millions of South African citizens. 
The free enterprise system, i n  spi te  of i ts  many 
positive achievements, runs the r i sk  of being seen 
not as an instrument fo r  eliminating one of the 
causes of conflict but as one of the ingredients of 
conflict. 
Those who believe i n  the free enterprise system and 
who want to  eliminate conflict w i l l  have to find ways 
and means of enabling black South Africans to  shaze 
significantly i n  economic progress, not merely as  
workers but as shareholders and partners and 
participants i n  the ownership of business i n  South 
Africa. (79) 
In  October 1979, the leadership of the Progressive Federal Party se t  up an 
Economic Commission chaired by Harry Schwarz to formulate a programme of economic 
reform for  South Africa. Schwarz described one of the most important roles of the 
Commission as developing "effective answers to be given to  Marxism as an economic 
doctrine". (80) When the l'charter fo r  social and economic progress" formulated by 
the Commission w a s  published, i n  November 1981, however, it proved to  be a rather 
generalized restatement of party ca l l s  fo r  an extension of economic benefits to al l  
South Africans, rather than a radical programme fo r  a new economic order. Among 
i t s  provisions were the establishment of a corporatist relationship between 
"capital, management and labour based upon the recognition that  each have [sic] an 
in teres t  i n  the welfare of others". Industrial democracy, prof i t  sharing a d  common 
decision-making were to be encouraged. A l l  workers were to  be accorded the r ight  
"to organise i n  trade unions of the i r  choice", i n  contrast to  the policy adopted i n  
1959. Nationalisation was to be avoided, and the s ta te ' s  ro le  i n  planning should be 
"indicative not compulsive". (81) 
Such redistribution of wealth as w a s  entailed i n  the proposals was not to 
be allowed to  affect  the wealthy. 
The wide g a p i n  income and wealth i n  South Africa 
require special action to enable those i n  a 
disadvantaged position, to bet ter  the i r  situation. 
This aim can be achieved only by l i f t i n g  the 
under-privileged rather than by impairing the 
standards enjoyed by the more fortunate. (82) 
The new economic policy of the party reflected the needs of the now dominant group 
within the capi ta l is t  class, monopoly capital ists ,  for  an educated, skil led and 
incorporated work force with a high level  of commitment to  the system. It also 
reflected the need to expand domestic demand throu& increased consumption, t o  
provide a larger market f o r  the goods of the new capital intensive, highly 
productive, industrial enterprises. Most of all, however, i t  reflected the need 
for  a stable, peacehl  country i n  which capital  accumulation could continue 
unhampered by continued threats of disruption or revolution. I n  exchange fo r  that ,  
the Progressive Federal Party and i ts  supporters within the capi ta l is t  class were 
prepared to  extend pol i t ica l  r ights to al l  black South Africans, and to  open up 
economic opportunities t o  them. 
G. Conclusions 
Two periods of intense class struggle and c r i s i s  i n  South Africa were marked by 
structural differences i n  capi ta l is t  production as well as differences i n  the 
nature of pol i t ica l  challenges to the apartheid system. The period 1960 to  1980 
saw the rapid monopolization of capi ta l is t  production with attendant concentration, 
centralization and interpenetration of capital,  leading to the emergence of a more 
united, dominant monopoly group within the capi ta l is t  class. It s a w  the continuing 
proletarianieation of black South Africans as a result ,  coupled with the emergence 
of strong and militant workers' organizations. After s ta te  action had destroyed the 
nationalist opposition of the nineteen-sixties, the following decade was associated 
with the emergence of a combination of populist and overt class struggle. The 
African nationalist organizations had mobilized opposition to  apartheid on the basis 
of the historical  and moral r ights of all South Africans, including Africans, to  
pol i t ica l  equality. The black consciousness movement stressed the common interes ts  
of all black people against white domination. By the end of the nineteen-seventies, 
workers' organizations had taken an overtly class view of the i r  society and even 
black consciousness organizations had introduced the concept of class in to  the i r  
analyses. The militancy of young black people and the strength and resilience of 
workers1 organizations forced the s t a t e  in to  a confused process of reform and 
accommodation. 
I n  the context of the sh i f t  to  a more proletarianized society and to overt 
class struggle, equivalent adjustments occurred i n  the ideology of the Progressive 
Party. As pol i t ica l  struggles against the s t a t e  changed from nationalist opposition 
to class opposition, so the emphasis of Progressive ideology shifted from race to 
class. A t  a time when the African nationalist struggle challenged white privilege, 
the party proposed answers designed to  buy off a black e l i t e  and sa t is fy  the 
aspirations of an influential  black minority. When the struggle developed into  a 
wider opposition to the whole system of eq lo i ta t ion ,  it proposed an extension of 
pol i t ica l  r ights and economic opportunity to al l ,  i n  an attempt to  persuade black 
South Africans that  thei r  in teres ts  were best served by a capi ta l is t ,  rather than a 
socia l is t  system. A t  the same time, the traditional l iberal  image of the pasty 
changed into that  of a party representing the views of "progressivew capital ists .  
As a coherent group of monopoly capi ta l is ts  emerged and became politicised, the 
parrty became more closely associated with them. 
Major sh i f t s  i n  direction by the party coincided with periods of pol i t ica l  
upheaval and c r i s i s  and reflected i ts  role as a pol i t ica l ly  innovative organization 
formulating alternatives to  government policies. While i t  sought to ref lect  the day 
to day needs of i t s  constituency, as an opposition party without control of the 
s ta te  i t s  major role was to identify long-term dangers and offer  alternative 
solutions to these. 
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